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The United States Supreme Court held in United 
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 
(1996), that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids a state from offering 
a unique educational opportunity 
to one gender when no comparable 
opportunity is provided for the 
excluded gender. The Court re-
jected the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia's proffered justification that 
the exclusion of women from the 
Virginia Military Institute fur-
thered the Commonwealth's im-
portant interest in providing diver-
sity in the educational choices 
offered to its residents. The 
Court's decision requires a govern-
ment to advance an "exceedingly 
persuasive justification" to sustain 
disparate treatment based upon 
gender. 
In 1839, the Virginia General 
Assembly established the Virginia 
Military Institute ("V.M.I.") as one 
of this country's first state military 
colleges. Since its inception, 
V .M.I. has been maintained by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, sub-
ject to the control of that state's 
legislature. In furtherance of its 
stated mISSIOn of producing 
"citizen-soldiers" for roles of lead-
ership in public life, V.M.I. consis-
tently refused to admit women as 
cadets. In Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 
(1982), the Supreme Court held 
that Mississippi's exclusion of 
otherwise qualified males from a 
state-sponsored school of nursing 
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solely on the basis of gender vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. 
Following that decision, V.M.!. 
appointed a committee to study the 
legality and wisdom of continuing 
to exclude women. Consonant 
with that committee's recommen-
dation, however, V.M.I. continued 
its single-sex admissions policy. 
In 1990, the United States At-
torney General filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of a female student denied 
admission to V.M.I. The com-
plaint alleged that the Institute's 
exclusively male admissions pol-
ICY violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. After a trial in the 
United States District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia, the 
trial court rejected the United 
States's equal protection chal-
lenge, reasoning that V .M.I.' s con-
tinued exclusion of women fur-
thered Virginia's interest of ensur-
ing diversity in an otherwise co-
educational system. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit vacated the judg-
ment of the district court. Finding 
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that the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia had advanced no sufficiently 
important interest to justify the 
exclusion of women from V.M.I., 
the court of appeals remanded the 
case to allow Virginia to alter 
V .M.I.' s admissions policy so as 
not to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. Noting that the litigation 
had not yet come to a final judg-
ment, the United States Supreme 
Court denied V.M.L's petition for 
writ of certiorari in May of 1993. 
Responding to the mandate of 
the Fourth Circuit, Virginia pro-
posed the Virginia Women's Insti-
tute for Leadership ("V.W.LL.") as 
a comparable alternative to the 
education afforded men at V.M.!. 
Located at Mary Baldwin College, 
V. W.LL. would offer a four-year, 
state-subsidized undergraduate 
program to approximately twenty-
five women. While sharing 
V.M.I. 's mission of producing 
"citizen-soldiers," the V.W.LL. 
planned to employ a significantly 
less adversarial means to achieve 
this end. 
Upon remand, the district court 
concluded that the Com-
monwealth's V.W.LL. proposal 
satisfied intermediate constitu-
tional scrutiny by offering women 
a comparable educational experi-
ence. A divided panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's judg-
ment. The Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that the potential benefits offered 
by a V.W.I.L. degree were "sub-
stantively comparable" to the ben-
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efits offered by a V.M.I. degree. 
By a margin of one vote, the 
Fourth Circuit denied an en bane 
rehearing. The Supreme Court 
then granted both the United States 
and the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia's petitions for writs of certio-
ran. 
Writing for six justices, Justice 
Ginsburg began the Court's analy-
sis by identifying the two ultimate 
issues presented by the case. Vir-
ginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (Justice 
Thomas took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of the case). 
First, did the Commonwealth of 
Virginia deny the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it 
excluded fully capable women 
from enrolling as cadets at V.M.I., 
thus denying a unique and extraor-
dinary developmental opportunity? 
Id. Second, if Virginia's denial of 
this opportunity did violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, what is 
the appropriate remedy? Id. 
Justice Ginsburg initially re-
viewed the history of gender dis-
crimination in the United States. 
Id. at 2274-75. The Court ob-
served that traditionally govern-
mental distinctions based upon 
gender need only survive "rational 
basis" scrutiny to be constitution-
ally permissible. ld. at 2275. Un-
der current analysis, however, such 
discrimination must survive the 
careful scrutiny established by 
Hogan and JE.B. v. Alabama ex 
reI. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-76. 
The Court enunciated a two-prong 
test that gender-based exclusionary 
treatment must satisfy so as not to 
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violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. ld. at 2275. First, once a 
prima facie claim of gender dis-
crimination has been established, 
the party seeking to defend gov-
ernmental classification based 
upon gender must initially demon-
strate an "exceedingly persuasive 
justification" for the distinction. 
Id. The burden of proving this 
justification rests entirely with the 
state. ld. Moreover, the justifica-
tion must be both genuine, rather 
than an ad hoc response to litiga-
tion, and may not rely upon overly 
broad generalizations regarding the 
differences in talents and capabili-
ties between females and males. 
ld. Second, under intermediate 
scrutiny, all such gender-based 
classifications must serve an im-
portant state interest, and the dis-
criminatory means employed must 
be substantially related to achiev-
ing that interest. ld. (citing 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. 
Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
Applying the initial prong of 
the test, the Court discussed Vir-
ginia's two asserted justifications 
for continuing V.M.I. 's ex-
clusively male admissions policy. 
Id. at 2276. First, the Common-
wealth argued that single-gender 
education provides significant 
educational benefits, as well as 
increasing diversity in educational 
opportunities. ld. Second, Vir-
ginia contended that V .M.I.' s ad-
versative educational approach 
would have to be discarded to ac-
commodate the admission of 
women. ld. In rejecting both prof-
fered justifications, the Supreme 
Court concluded "that Virginia has 
shown no 'exceedingly persuasive 
justification' for excluding all 
women from the citizen-soldier 
training afforded by V.M.I." ld. 
In analyzing Virginia's first 
justification, the Court noted that 
the Commonwealth's alleged inter-
est in single-sex education bore no 
resemblance "to 'the actual pur-
pose underlying the discriminatory 
classification. '" Id. at 2277 (quot-
ing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730). Jus-
tice Ginsburg observed that, from 
1839 through V.M.I.'s reaction to 
the Hogan decision, there was no 
evidence that indicated Virginia 
actually sought to evenhandedly 
advance diversity through an inter-
est in single-gender education. Id. 
at 2277-79. The majority rejected 
Virginia's "diversity" argument, 
reasoning that a "genuine" interest 
in diversity would not be furthered 
by a policy that only "serves the 
State's sons, [but] makes no provi-
sion whatever for her daughters." 
ld. at 2279. Implicit in this analy-
sis was the determination that 
Virginia's diversity justification 
was only an ad hoc response to 
litigation. See id. at 2277. 
Turning to the Com-
monwealth's second justification 
for denying women admittance to 
V.M.I., the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged alterations would be 
necessary to accommodate the 
admission of women to V.M.I., but 
rejected Virginia's premise that 
these changes would necessarily 
"destroy" V.M.I. ld. at 2279. The 
Court cited testimony that some 
women can endure the physical 
activities required of cadets, as 
well as the Fourth Circuit's earlier 
conclusion that V .M.I.' s adversa-
tive methodology is not "inher-
ently unsuitable to women." ld. 
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 
976 F.2d 890,899 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
Finally, the majority hypothesized 
that the admission of women to 
V.M.I. could mirror "[w]omen's 
successful entry into the federal 
military academies." ld. at 2281. 
Thus, the court rejected the prem-
ise that admitting women to V.M.I. 
would "destroy" the institution 
because the admission of women 
as cadets was not in conflict with 
V .M.I.' s stated mission of produc-
ing "citizen-soldiers." ld. at 2281-
82. 
Having concluded that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia fell 
short of its initial hurdle of provid-
ing the "exceedingly persuasive 
justification" necessary to justify 
V.M.I. 's exclusively male admit-
tance policy, the Supreme Court 
next determined the appropriate 
remedy for Virginia's constitu-
tional violation. ld. at 2282. The 
Court observed that a remedial 
decree must closely correspond to 
the constitutional violation, and 
must place the disadvantaged par-
ties in the position they would 
have occupied absent the violation. 
ld. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 280 (1977)). Noting the 
relative inferiority of V.W.I.L.'s 
proposed endowment, military 
training, student body, faculty, 
course selection, physical facili-
ties, and alumni network, the 
Court concluded that a V.W.I.L. 
degree would be substantially infe-
rior to a V.M.I. degree for the fore-
seeable future. ld. at 2283-85. 
Indicating that "[t]here is no rea-
son to believe that the admission 
of women capable of all the activi-
ties required of V.M.I. cadets 
would destroy the Institute rather 
than enhance its capacity," the 
Supreme Court held that the Com-
monwealth of Virginia could not 
offer qualified women anything 
less than "a V.M.I.-quality educa-
tion." ld. at 2287. 
Concurring with the Court's 
judgment, but not its reasoning, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited four-
teen cases decided since 1976 to 
support his argument that firmly 
established precedent required that 
gender-based discrimination must 
only bear a close and substantial 
relationship to an important state 
interest. ld. at 2288. Hence, in 
Rehnquist's opinion, the major-
ity's requirement that government 
must demonstrate an "exceedingly 
persuasive justification" to sustain 
gender classification unnecessarily 
"introduces an element of uncer-
tainty respecting the appropriate 
test." ld. Ultimately, however, the 
Chief Justice agreed with the result 
reached by the majority since, as 
proposed, V.W.I.L. "fails as a rem-
edy, because it is distinctly inferior 
to the existing men's institution 
and will continue to be for the 
foreseeable future." ld. at 2291. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia theo-
rized that V.M.I.'s exclusively 
male admissions policy satisfied 
traditional intermediate scrutiny. 
ld. at 2293-94. He accused the 
majority of introducing the "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" 
requirement as the only means by 
which the court could reach its 
desired result. ld. at 2294-95. 
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that 
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the effect of the Court's decision 
would be to "enshrine[] the notion 
that no substantial educational 
value is to be served by an all-
men's military academy." ld. at 
2292. 
The decision issued by the 
United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Virginia reflected 
a strengthened commitment to the 
principle that the Constitution does 
not permit a state to treat similarly 
situated individuals differently 
based upon gender except in the 
most compelling circumstances. 
The Court's reasoning, however, 
arguably raised more questions 
than it resolved. Significantly, it is 
neither self-evident nor explained 
in the Court's opinion how the 
"exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" requirement differs substan-
tially from the prong of traditional 
intermediate scrutiny requiring the 
state to demonstrate an "important 
governmental interest." Moreover, 
the majority's analysis provided no 
guidance as to whether the state 
must now demonstrate an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" 
in other equal protection categories 
where the Court has traditionally 
applied intermediate scrutiny. 
While the majority opinion sug-
gests a state may engage in gender 
classification based upon a legiti-
mate interest in diversity, lower 
courts will have to struggle with 
whether the breadth of the 
Supreme Court's reasoning actu-
ally permits any circumstances 
under which a state may legiti-
mately offer a "unique" opportu-
nity to dne gender without provid-
ing an absolutely comparable alter-
native to the excluded gender. 
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